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Abstract
Quantum key distribution over probabilistic quantum repeaters is addressed. We compare, under
practical assumptions, two such schemes in terms of their secure key generation rates per quantum
memory. The two schemes under investigation are the one proposed by Duan et al. in [Nat. 414,
413 (2001)] and that of Sangouard et al. in [Phys. Rev. A 76, 050301 (2007)]. We consider
various sources of imperfection in both protocols, such as nonzero double-photon probabilities
at the sources, dark counts in detectors, and inefficiencies in the channel, photodetectors and
memories. We also consider memory decay and dephasing processes in our analysis. For the latter
system, we determine the maximum value of the double-photon probability beyond which secret-key
distillation is not possible. We also find crossover distances for one nesting level to its subsequent
one. We finally compare the two protocols in terms of their achievable secret key generation rates
at their optimal settings. Our results specify regimes of operation where one system outperforms
the other.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite all practical progress with quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–4], its implemen-
tation over long distances remains to be a daunting task. In conventional QKD protocols
such as BB84 [5], channel loss and detector noises set an upper bound on the achievable
security distance [6]. In addition, the path loss results in an exponential decay of the secret
key generation rate with distance. Both these issues can, in principle, be overcome if one
implements entanglement-based QKD protocols [7, 8] over quantum repeater systems [9–
12]. This approach, however, is not without its own challenges. Quantum repeaters require
quantum memory (QM) units that can interact with light and can store their states for suf-
ficiently long times. Moreover, highly efficient quantum gates might be needed to perform
two-qubit operations on these QMs [9]. The latter issue has been alleviated, to some extent,
by introducing a novel technique by Duan, Lukin, Cirac and Zoller (DLCZ) [10], in which
initial entanglement distribution and swapping, thereafter, rely on probabilistic linear-optic
operations. Since its introduction, the DLCZ idea has been extended and a number of new
proposals have emerged [13–18]. Such probabilistic schemes for quantum repeaters particu-
larly find applications in QKD systems of mid-to-long distances, which makes them worthy
of analytical scrutiny. This papers compares DLCZ with one of its favorite successors, [17],
which relies on single photon sources (termed SPS, hereafter). Using a general system-
level approach, which encompasses many relevant physical sources of imperfections in both
systems, we provide a realistic account of their performance in terms of their secret key
generation rates per logical memory used. This measure not only quantifies performance,
but it also accounts for possible costs of implementation.
The SPS protocol attempts to resolve one of the key drawbacks in the original DLCZ
protocol: multi-photon emissions. DLCZ uses atomic ensembles as QMs, which lend them-
selves to multi-photon emissions. This leads to obtaining not-fully-entangled states, hence
resulting in lower key rates when used for QKD. To tackle this issue, in the SPS protocol,
entanglement is distributed by ideally generating single photons, which will either be stored
in QMs, or directed toward a measurement site. Whereas, in principle, the SPS protocol
should not deal with the multi-photon problem, in practice, it is challenging to build on-
demand single photon sources that do not produce any multi-photon components. A fair
comparison between the two systems is only possible when one considers different sources
2
of non-idealities in both cases, as we will pursue in this paper.
The SPS protocol is one of the many proposed schemes for probabilistic quantum re-
peaters. In [18], authors provide a review of all such schemes and compare them in terms
of the average time that it takes to generate entangled states, of a certain fidelity, between
two remote memories. Their conclusion is that in the limit of highly efficient memories and
detectors, the top three protocol are the SPS protocol and two others that rely on entan-
gled/two photon sources [14, 16]. In more practical regimes, however, the SPS protocol
seems to have the best performance per memory/mode used. In this paper, we therefore
focus on the SPS protocol, and will investigate, under practical assumptions, whether the
above conclusion remains valid in the context of QKD systems.
Our work is distinct from previous related work in its focusing on the performance of
QKD systems over quantum repeaters. In [18], authors have adopted the general measure
of fidelity to find the average time of entanglement generation. Whereas their approach
provides us with a general insight into some aspects of quantum repeater systems, it cannot
be directly applied to the case of QKD. In the latter, the performance is not only a function
of the entanglement generation rate, but also the quantum bit error rate caused by using non-
ideal entangled states. To include both these issues, here, we adopt the secret-key generation
rate per memory as the main figure of merit, by which we can specify the optimal setting
of the system and its performance in different regimes of operation.
Another key feature of our work is to use a normalized figure of merit to compare the
DLCZ and SPS protocols. In practice, to obtain a sufficiently large key rate in such prob-
abilistic systems, one must use multiple memories and/or modes in parallel. In order to
account for the cost of the system, in our analysis, we provide a normalized key rate per
memory and/or mode. We calculate the dependence of the secret key generation rate on dif-
ferent system parameters when resolving or non-resolving detectors are used. In particular,
we find the optimal values for relevant system parameters if loss, double-photon emissions
and dark counts are considered. Moreover, we account for the dephasing and the decay of
memories in our analysis, which, we believe, is unprecedented.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II, we review the DLCZ and the SPS protocols,
their entanglement distribution and swapping schemes, as well as their QKD measurements.
In Sec. III, we present our methodology for calculating the secret key generation rate for
the SPS protocol, followed by numerical results in Sec. IV. We draw our conclusions in Sec.
3
V.
II. TWO PROBABILISTIC SCHEMES FOR QUANTUM REPEATERS
In this section we will review two probabilistic schemes, namely, DLCZ and SPS, for
quantum repeaters. We describe the multiple-memory setup for such systems and model
relevant system components.
A. DLCZ entanglement-distribution scheme
The DLCZ scheme works as follows; see Fig. 1(a). Ensemble memories A and B, at
distance L, are made of atoms with Λ-level configurations. They are all initially in their
ground states. By coherently pumping these atoms, some of them may undergo off-resonant
Raman transitions that produce Stokes photons. The resulting photons are sent toward a
50:50 beam splitter located at distance L/2 between A and B. If, ideally, only one photon
has been produced in total at the ensembles, one and, at most, only one of the detectors in
Fig. 1(a) clicks. In such a case, the DLCZ protocol heralds A and B to be ideally in one of
the Bell state |ψ±〉AB = (|10〉AB ± |01〉AB) /
√
2, where |0〉J is the ensemble ground state and
|1〉J = S†J |0〉J is the symmetric collective excited state of ensemble J = A, B, where S†J is
the corresponding creation operator [10]. An important feature of such collective excitations
is that they can be read out by converting their states into photonic states.
The fundamental source of error in the DLCZ scheme is the multiple-excitation effect,
where more than one Stokes photon are produced [11]. If the probability of generating
one Stokes photon is denoted by pc, there is a probability p
2
c that each ensemble emits one
photon. If this happens, a click on one of the two detectors heralds entanglement generation,
whereas the memories are in the separable state |11〉AB.
In practice, one has to find the right balance between the heralding probability, which
increases with pc, and the quantum bit error rate (QBER), which also increases with pc. In
[11], authors find the optimal value of pc that maximizes the secret key generation rate in
various scenarios when photon-number resolving detectors (PNRDs) or non-resolving photon
detectors (NRPDs) are used. In this paper, we use their results in our comparative study.
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Schematic diagram for entanglement distribution between quantum memories (QMs)
A and B for (a) the DLCZ protocol and (b) the SPS protocol. In both cases, we assume QMs can store
multiple excitations. Sources, memories and detectors are represented by circles, squares and half-circles,
respectively. Vertical bars denote beam splitters. In both protocols the detection of a single photon ideally
projects the two memories onto an entangled state.
B. SPS entanglement-distribution scheme
The SPS protocol, proposed in [17], aims at reducing multi-photon errors and, in par-
ticular, terms of the form |11〉AB by using single-photon sources. The architecture of this
scheme is presented in Fig. 1(b). The two remote parties each have one single-photon source
and one memory. In the ideal scenario, each source produces exactly one photon on demand,
and these photons are sent through identical beam splitters with transmission coefficients η.
It can be shown that the state shared by the QMs after a single click on one of the detectors
in Fig. 1(b) is given by [17]
η|00〉AB〈00|+ (1− η) |ψ±〉AB 〈ψ±| , (1)
which has our desired entangled state plus a vacuum component. The latter, at the price
of reducing the rate, can be selected out once the above state is measured at later stages
[10, 11].
In a practical setup, several sources of imperfection must be considered in Fig. 1(b).
First, most known techniques for generating single photons suffer from multiple-photon
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FIG. 2. (Color online) (a) Entanglement connection between two entangled links A-A′ and B′-B. The
memories A′ and B′ are read out and the resulting photons are combined on a 50:50 beam splitter. A click
on one of the detectors projects A and B into an entangled state. The retrieval efficiencies and quantum
efficiencies are represented by fictitious beam splitters with transmission coefficient ηc and ηD, respectively.
(b) The equivalent butterfly transformation to the measurement module, where ηs = ηcηD.
emissions. That includes single-photon sources that rely on parametric down-conversion
[19, 20], quasi-atomic structures such as quantum dots [21], or the partial memory-readout
technique described in [18]. In all cases, there is a nonzero probability to generate more than
one photon, which manifests itself in producing nonzero values for second-order coherence
functions [19, 20]. For practical purposes, however, it is often sufficient to consider the effect
of two-photon states, as we will do, in this paper. It turns out that this approximation is
particularly valid for the systems of interest in this paper. One should also consider non-
idealities in QMs. In our analysis, we account for reading and writing efficiencies of QMs,
as well as their decay and dephasing processes. We assume that QMs can store multiple
excitations.
Throughout the paper, we assume that both setups in Fig. 1 are symmetric and phase
stabilized. Furthermore, all conditions required for a proper quantum interference at 50-50
beam splitters are assumed to be met. Recent experimental progress in QKD shows that it
is indeed possible to achieve these conditions [22, 23].
C. Entanglement swapping and QKD measurements
Figure 2(a) shows the entanglement swapping setup for the DLCZ and the SPS protocols.
Entanglement is established between QM pairs AA′ and B′B using either of protocols.
A partial Bell-state measurement (BSM) on photons retrieved from the middle QMs A′
6
350:50
c
K
c
K
D
K
D
K
50:50
c
K
c
K
D
K
D
KMM
entangled
A
C
B
D
L
FIG. 3. (Color online) QKD measurements on two entangled pairs. Two pairs of memories, A-B and C-D,
each share an entangled state. Memories are read out and the resulting photons are combined at a beam
splitter and then detected. Different QKD measurements can be performed by choosing different phase shift
values, ϕ, of 0 and pi/2.
and B′ is then followed, which upon success, leaves A and B entangled. The BSM is
effectively performed by a 50:50 beam splitter and single-photon detectors. To include
the effects of the atomic-to-photonic conversion efficiency and the photodetectors’ quantum
efficiency, we introduce two fictitious beam splitters with transmission coefficients ηc and
ηD, respectively. All photodetctors in Fig. 2 will then have unity quantum efficiencies. Note
that the parameter ηc also includes the memory decay during the storage time.
Figure 2(b) provides a simplified model for the measurement module in Fig. 2(a). The
50:50 beam splitter and the two fictitious beam splitters in Fig. 2(b) constitute what we
call a butterfly operation, which will be further studied in Sec. III and Appendix A.
Alice and Bob use two butterfly operations to generate a raw key bit, as shown in Fig. 3.
After generating entangled pairs over a distance L, Alice and Bob retrieve the states of
memories and perform a QKD measurement on the resulting photons. They apply a random
relative phase shift, ϕ, of either 0 or π/2, between their two fields. They will later, at the
sifting stage, only keep data points where the same phase value is used by both parties.
They then turn their sifted keys into a secure key by using privacy amplification and error
reconciliation techniques. Eavesdroppers can be detected by following the BBM92 or the
Ekert protocol [7, 24].
As mentioned in Sec. I, previous analyses only provide the fidelity or the time required
for a successful creation of an entangled state [17]. Instead, in Sec. III, we will calculate
the secret key generation rate for the SPS scheme and compare it with that of the DLCZ
protocol reported in [11].
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FIG. 4. (Color online) (a) A quantum repeater with multiple quantum memories per node. At each round,
we employ entanglement distribution protocol to entangle any unentangled memory pairs over shortest links.
At any such cycle, we also match up entangled pairs at different stations to perform Bell-state measurements
(BSMs). (b) A quantum repeater with multimode memories. In each round, we apply our entanglement
distribution scheme on all M modes, until one of them becomes entangled. BSM will be followed as soon as
entanglement is established on both sides.
D. Multiple-memory configuration
In order to compare different quantum repeater setups, we consider the multiple-memory
configuration shown in Fig. 4(a) along with the cyclic protocol described in [25, 26]. In this
protocol, in every cycle of duration L0/c, where L0 is the length of the shortest segment
in a quantum repeater, and c is the speed of light in the channel, we try to entangle any
unentangled pairs of memories at distance L0. We assume our entanglement-distribution
protocol succeeds with probability PS (L0). At each cycle, we also perform as many BSMs
as possible at the intermediate nodes. The main requirement for such a protocol is that, at
the stations that we perform BSMs, we must be aware of establishment of entanglement over
links of length l/2 before extending it to l (informed BSMs). We use the results of [25] to
calculate the generation rate of entangled states per memory in the limit of infinitely many
memories. It is given by Rent (L) = PS (L/2
n)P
(1)
M P
(2)
M ...P
(n)
M / (2L/c) , where P
(i)
M , i = 1...n,
is the BSM success probability at nesting level i for a quantum repeater with n nesting
levels.
We use the following procedure, in forthcoming sections, to find the secret key generation
rate of the setup in Fig. 4(a). For each entanglement distribution scheme, we find PS (L0)
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and relevant PM probabilities to derive Rent (L) . We then find the sifted key generation rate
by multiplying Rent (L) by the probability, Pclick, that an acceptable click pattern occurs
upon QKD measurements. Finally, the ratio between the number of secure bits and the
sifted key bits is calculated using the Shor-Preskill lower bound [27]. In the limit of an
infinitely long key, the secret key generation rate per logical memory is lower bounded by
RQKD (L) = max(Rent (L)Pclick [1− 2H (ǫQ)] , 0), (2)
where ǫQ denotes the QBER, and H(p) = −p log2 p− (1− p) log2(1− p), for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
E. Multimode-memory configuration
Another way to speed up the entanglement generation rate is via using multimode mem-
ories [15, 28]. As can be seen in Fig. 4(b), in this setup, we only use one physical memory
per node but each memory is capable of storing multiple modes. In each round, we attempt
to entangle memories at distance L0 by entangling, at least, one of the existing M modes.
Once this occurs, we stop entanglement generation on that leg and wait until a BSM can
be performed. For readout, all modes must be retrieved in order to perform BSMs or QKD
measurements on particular modes of interest. In effect, this scheme is similar to that of
Fig. 4(a), except that entanglement distribution is not sequentially applied to unentangled
modes. The success probability for entanglement distribution between the two memories is,
however, M times that of Fig. 4(a). One can show that, the generation rate of entangled
states per mode is approximately given by
(
2
3
)n
Rent (L) [18, 26].
In our forthcoming analysis, we only consider the case of Fig. 4(a), but our results are
extensible to the case of Fig. 4(b) by accounting for the relevant prefactor.
F. Memory decay and dephasing
Quantum memories are expected to decay and dephase while storing quantum states.
In this paper, we model these two processes independently. The decay process, with a
time constant T1, can be absorbed in the retrieval efficiency of memories. If the retrieval
efficiency immediately after writing into the memory is given by η0, after a storage time T ,
the retrieval efficiency is given by ηc = η0 exp(−T/T1). Different memories in the multiple-
memory setup of Fig. 4(a) undergo different decay times. In our analysis, we consider the
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worst case scenario where all memories have decayed for T = L/c, which is only applicable
to the far-end memories. Under this assumption, ηc can be treated as a constant at all stages
of entanglement swapping.
We model the memory dephasing via a dephasing channel, by which the probability
of dephasing after a period T is given by ed = [1 − exp(−T/T2)]/2. In the context of
the QKD protocol in Fig. 3, this phase error is equivalent to the misalignment error in
a conventional polarization-based BB84 protocol and has mostly the same effect. In our
analysis, we neglect the effect of dephasing at the middle stages, and only consider its effect
on the far-end memories used for the QKD protocol. Again, for the multiple-memory setup
of Fig. 4(a), the relevant storage time is given by T = L/c [25].
III. SPS SECRET KEY GENERATION RATE
In this section, the secure key generation rate for the SPS scheme proposed in [17] is
calculated. As was shown in section II, this scheme relies on simultaneous generation of
single photons in two remote sites. Most practical schemes for the generation of single
photons, however, suffer from the possibility of multiple-photon emissions. To address this
issue, in this section, we consider non-ideal photon sources with nonzero probabilities for
two-photon emissions, and find the secret key generation rate in the repeater and no-repeater
cases.
Suppose our photon sources emit one photon with probability 1−p and two photons with
probability p. We, therefore, have the following input density matrix for the initial state of
l and r sources in Fig. 5(a)
ρ
(in)
lr = ρ
(in)
l ⊗ ρ(in)r , (3)
where
ρ
(in)
j ≡ (1− p) |1 〉jj 〈1|+ p|2 〉jj 〈2| , j = l, r. (4)
As we will show later, in a practical regime of operation, p ≪ 1; hence, in our following
analysis, we neglect O (p2) terms corresponding to the simultaneous emission of two photons
by both sources.
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FIG. 5. (Color online) A schematic model for the SPS scheme. In (a) the memories’ writing efficiencies,
the path loss and the detectors’ efficiencies are represented by fictitious beam splitters with transmission
coefficients ηm, ηt and ηD, respectively. In (b), an equivalent model is represented, where we have grouped
beam splitters in the form of butterfly modules; see Fig. 6 . Here, ηtηD = ηmηd and the model is valid so
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FIG. 6. (Color online) A generic butterfly module, represented by BηB ,ηx , where ηB and ηx are transmis-
sivities for beam splitters shown in the figure.
A. No-repeater case
In this section, we describe how we obtain parameters PS, Pclick, and RQKD for the setup
in Fig. 5(a) and QKD measurements as in Fig. 3.
Figure 5(a) depicts the entanglement-distribution setup for the SPS scheme. In our model
the memories’ writing efficiencies, the path loss and the detectors’ efficiencies are represented
by fictitious beam splitters with transmission coefficients ηm, ηt and ηD, respectively, where
ηt = exp[−L/(2Latt)] with Latt = 25 km for an optical fiber channel. Photodetectors, in
Fig. 5, are then assumed to have unity quantum efficiencies.
In our analysis, we use an equivalent setup, as shown in Fig. 5(b), where beam splitters
have been rearranged such that ηtηD = ηmηd. We can then recognize similar building blocks,
which we referred to by butterfly modules, in Fig. 5(b). A butterfly module, as shown in
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Fig. 6, is a two-input two-output building block consisting of three beam splitters. For an
input state ρL′R′ in Fig. 6, we denote the output state on ports L and R by BηB ,ηx (ρL′R′) .
We use well-known models for beam splitters [29] to find output density matrices for
input states to a generic butterfly module. In Appendix A, we find the relevant input-
output relationships for the states of interest. We use Maple 15 to simplify some of our
analytical results. We can then find, ρALBR, the joint state of the memories and the optical
modes entering detectors L and R in Fig. 5(b) by applying the butterfly operation three
times, as follows
ρALBR = B0.5,ηd
(
Bη,ηm
(
ρ
(in)
l
)
⊗ Bη,ηm
(
ρ(in)r
))
. (5)
According to the SPS protocol, a click on exactly one of the detectors L or R, in Fig. 5(b),
would herald the success of entanglement distribution. This process can be modeled by
applying proper measurement operators considering whether PNRDs or NRPDs are used.
For example, for a click on detector L, the explicit form of the measurement operator is
given by
M =


(1− dc)[|1 〉LL 〈1| ⊗ |0 〉RR 〈0| +
dc|0 〉LL 〈0| ⊗ |0 〉RR 〈0|], PNRD
(1− dc)[(IL − |0 〉LL 〈0|) ⊗ |0 〉RR 〈0| +
dc|0 〉LL 〈0| ⊗ |0 〉RR 〈0|], NRPD
(6)
where IL denotes the identity operator for the mode entering the left detector [30], and dc
is the dark-count rate per gate width per detector.
After the measurement, the resulting joint state, ρAB, of quantum memories is given by:
ρAB =
trL,R (ρALBRM)
P
, (7)
where
P = tr (ρALBRM) =
PS (L)
2
(8)
is the probability that the conditioning event M occurs. The last equality is due to the
symmetry assumption.
For QKD measurements, we assume two pairs of memories, A-B and C-D, are given in
an initial state similar to that of Eq. (7). We use the scheme described in Fig. 3 to perform
QKD measurements. For simplicity, we assume both users use zero phase shifts; other cases
can be similarly worked out in our symmetric setup. In Fig. 3, the retrieval efficiency and the
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quantum detectors efficiency are represented by fictitious beam splitters with, respectively,
transmission coefficient ηc and ηD. It is again possible to remodel the setup in Fig. 3 as
shown in Fig. 2(b), and use the butterfly operation B0.5,ηs , where ηs = ηcηD. The density
matrix right before photodetection in Fig. 3 is then given by B0.5,ηs (B0.5,ηs (ρAB ⊗ ρCD)) ,
where one of the B-operators is applied to modes A and C, and the other one to modes B
and D. Using this state, we find Pclick and ǫQ as outlined in Appendix B.
Using Eq. (2), the secure key generation rate per memory, RQKD, in the no-repeater setup,
is then lower bounded by [11]:
R1 = max
[
(1− 2H(ǫQ)) PS (L)
2L/c
Pclick/2, 0
]
(9)
where
PS (L)
2L/c
, given by Eq. (8), is the generation rate of entangled pairs per logical memory
Pclick is the probability of creating a sifted key bit by using two entangled pairs, and [1 −
2H(ǫQ)] is the probability of creating a secure key bit out of each sifted key bit. Here, we
assume a biased basis choice to avoid an extra factor of two reduction in the rate [31]. The
full definition for Pclick is given by Eq. (B3). The QBER,
ǫQ =
Perror
Pclick
, (10)
where Perror is the probability that Alice and Bob assign different bits to their sifted keys,
is given by Eq. (B4).
B. Repeater case
First, consider the repeater setup of nesting level one in Fig. 2(a). We use the structure
of Fig. 5(a) to distribute entanglement between A-A′ and B′-B memories. The initial joint
state of the system, ρAA′BB′ = ρAA′⊗ρBB′ , can then be found, using Eq. (7), as described in
the previous section. We then apply a BSM by reading memories A′ and B′ and interfering
the resulting optical modes at a 50:50 beam splitter. Success is declared if exactly one of
the detectors in Fig. 2(a) clicks. This can be modeled by applying measurement operators
in Eq. (6), which results in
ρAB =
trLR (Mρ
′
ALBR)
PL
, (11)
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where ρ′ALBR = B0.5,ηs (ρAA′BB′), where L and R represent the input modes to the photode-
tectors. Note that, in Fig. 2, the detectors have ideal unity quantum efficiencies. Moreover,
PL = tr (Mρ
′
ALBR) = PM/2 (12)
is the probability that only the left detector clicks in the BSM module of Fig. 2. A click on
the right detector has the same probability by symmetry.
In order to find the secret key generation rate, we will follow similar steps to the no-
repeater case. That is, we apply the butterfly operation to find relevant density matrices,
from which Pclick and ǫQ can be obtained. From Eq. (2), in the one-node repeater case,
RQKD is lower bounded by
R2 = max
[
(1− 2H(ǫQ)) PS (L/2)
2L/c
PM Pclick/2, 0
]
. (13)
Using the same approach, and by using Eq. (2), we find the secret key generation rate
for higher nesting levels. The details of which, have, however, been omitted for the sake of
brevity.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results for the secret key generation rate of the SPS
protocol, versus different system parameters, in the no-repeater and repeater cases, and we
compare them with that of the DLCZ protocol. As mentioned earlier, we have used Maple
15 to analytically derive expressions for Eqs. (2), (9), and (13) when PNRDs or NRPDs are
used. Unless otherwise noted, we use the nominal values summarized in Table I for all the
results presented in this section.
A. SPS key rate versus system parameters
1. Source transmission coefficient
Figure 7 shows the secret key generation rate per memory, RQKD, versus the source
transmission coefficient η in Fig. 1(b), at p = 0.001 and L = 250 km. It can be seen
that there exist optimal values of η for both repeater and no-repeater systems. Table II
summarizes these optimum values for different nesting levels. The optimal value of η for the
14
Memory writing efficiency, ηm 0.5
Quantum efficiency, ηD 0.3
Memory retrieval efficiency, ηc 0.7
Dark count per pulse, dc 10
−6
Attenuation length, Latt 25 km
Speed of light, c 2 · 105 km/s
Decay (dephasing) time constants, T1 (T2) ∞
TABLE I. Nominal values used in our numerical results.
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FIG. 7. (Color online) RQKD versus the source transmission coefficient η for the PNRDs and NRPDs in the
no-repeater and one-node repeater cases. Here, p = 0.001, L = 250 km, and n = 1 for the repeater system;
other parameters are listed in Table I
no-repeater system is higher than the repeater ones, and that is because of the additional
entanglement swapping steps in the latter systems. Another remarkable feature in Fig. 7 is
that the penalty of using NRPDs, versus PNRDs, seems to be minor at p = 10−3. PNRDs
better show their advantage at higher values of p when double-photon terms become more
evident.
The existence of an optimal value for η arises from a competition between the probability
of entanglement distribution PS, which grows with η, and Pclick, which decreases with η.
This has been demonstrated in the inset of Fig. 7. The latter issue is mainly because of the
vacuum component in Eq. (1). In the case of the repeater system, PM also decreases with η
for the same reason, and that is why the optimal value of η is lower for repeater systems.
The optimum values of η in Fig. 7 are interestingly almost identical to the value of η that
minimizes the total time for a successful creation of an entangled state, as prescribed in [17].
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nesting level PNRD NRPD
0 0.35 0.34
1 0.28 0.27
2 0.21 0.20*
3 0.12 0.11*
TABLE II. Optimal values of η, at p = 0.001 and L = 250 km, for repeater and no-repeater systems, when
PNRDs or NRPDs are used. The figures with an asterisk are approximate values.
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FIG. 8. (Color online) RQKD versus distance for up to three nesting levels at two different dark count rates
at p = 10−4. All other values are listed in Tables I and II.
It is because, at a fixed distance, the QBER term in Eqs. (9) and (13) is mainly a function
of the double-photon probability and the dark count rate, and it does not considerably vary
with η. More generally, the optimum values of η remain constant as in Table II so long as
the error terms are well below the cut-off threshold in QKD.
2. Nesting levels and crossover distance
Figure 8 depicts the normalized secret key generation rate versus distance for different
nesting levels. At dc = 0, the slope advantage, proportional to PS(L/2
n), for higher nesting
levels is clear in the figure. Because of additional entanglement swapping stages, the no-
path-loss rate at L = 0 is, however, lower for higher nesting levels. That would result in
crossover distances—at which one system outperforms another—once we move from one
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FIG. 9. (Color online) The crossover distance, at which a repeater system with nesting level n outperforms
a system with nesting level n− 1, as a function of measurement efficiency ηs = ηcηD, at p = 10−4. All other
parameters are taken from Tables I and II except for the dark count, which is 10−7.
nesting level to its subsequent one. The crossover distance has architectural importance and
will specify the optimum distance between repeater nodes.
The crossover distance is a function of various system parameters. As shown in the
inset of Fig. 8, positive dark count rates can considerably change the crossover distance. By
including dark counts in our analysis, there will be a cutoff security distance for each nesting
level. By increasing the dark count rate, these cutoff distances will decrease and become
closer to each other. That would effectively reduce the crossover distance. At dark count
rates as high as dc = 10
−6, the superiority of 3 over 2 nesting levels at long distances would
almost diminish as they both have almost the same cutoff distances.
The crossover distance will decrease if component efficiencies go up. This has been shown
in Fig. 9 when the crossover distance is depicted versus measurement efficiency. The latter
directly impacts the BSM success probability, PM , and that is why the larger its value the
lower the crossover distance. Larger values of ηm also reduce the vacuum component, thus
enhancing the chance of success at the entanglement swapping stage.
It can be noted in Fig. 9 that, even for highly efficient devices, the optimum distance
between repeater nodes would tend to lie at around 150-200 km. For instance at L =
1000 km, and with the nominal values used in this paper, the optimum nesting level is 2,
which implies that the distance between two nodes of the repeater is 250 km. This could
be a long distance for practical purposes, such as for phase stabilization, and that might
require us to work at a suboptimal distancing. The latter would further reduce the secret
key generation rate. Our result is somehow different from what is reported in [18, 26], albeit
one should bear in mind the different set of assumptions and measures used therein.
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repeater and one-node repeater cases. (b) Cutoff double-photon probability, at which the key rate becomes
zero, versus the dark count rate dc. The higher the dark count rate, the less room for multi-photon errors.
All graphs are at L = 250 km.
3. Double-photon probability
Figures 10 show the secret key generation rate for the SPS protocol, at the optimal values
of η listed in Table II, versus the double-photon probability p in the no-repeater and repeater
cases. It can be seen that, in both cases, there exists a cutoff probability at which RQKD
becomes zero. This point corresponds to the threshold QBER of 11% from the Shor-Preskill
security proof. In the case of QMs with sufficiently long coherence times, as is the case in
Fig. 10, the QBER in our system stems from two factors: dark count and double-photon
probability. The former is proportional to dc/ηd and it comes into effect only when the path
loss is significant. The latter, however, affects the QBER at all distances. To better see
this issue, in Fig. 10(b), the cutoff probability is depicted versus the dark count rate. It can
be seen that the cutoff probability linearly goes down with dc, which confirms the additive
contribution of dark counts and two-photon emissions to the QBER.
The cutoff probability at dc = 0 deserves a particular attention. As can be seen in
Fig. 10(b), for the no-repeater system, the maximum allowed value of p is about 0.028 for
PNRDs and 0.026 for NRPDs. This implies that the QBER in this case, at dc = 0, is
roughly given by 4p. This can be verified by finding the contributions from two- and single-
photon components in Eq. (4). We can then show that the QBER, at the optimal value
of η in Table II, is roughly given by 3(1 + η)p ≈ 4p. Similarly, in the repeater case, one
can show that each BSM almost doubles the contribution of two-photon emissions to the
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nesting level cutoff double-photon probability
0 2.5 × 10−2
1 5.0 × 10−3
2 1.8 × 10−3
3 2.1 × 10−4
TABLE III. Cutoff double-photon probabilities when PNRDs are used for different nesting levels. The
paramter values used are listed in Tables I and II .
QBER. Considering that four pairs of entangled states is now needed, and that the chance
of making an error for an unentangled pair is typically 1/2, the QBER is roughly given by
4×2×3(1+η)p/2 ≈ 16p, which implies that, to the first-order approximation, the maximum
allowed value for p is about 0.11/16 = 0.0068. Figure 10(a) confirms this result, where the
cutoff probability is about 0.0056 for the PNRDs and 0.0054 for the NRPDs, corresponding
to ǫQ ≈ 20p.
With a similar argument as above, one may roughly expect a factor of 4-to-5 increase in
the QBER for each additional nesting level. This implies that for a repeater system with
nesting level 3, we should expect a QBER around 500p just because of the double-photon
emission. Table III confirms our approximation by providing the actual cutoff figures for
different nesting levels. We discuss the practical implications of this finding later in this
section.
4. Memory dephasing
Figure 11(a) shows the secret key generation rate per memory for the SPS protocol with
NRPDs versus distance for two different values of the dephasing time, T2, at p = 10
−3. It is
clear that, by reducing the coherence time, the security distance drops to shorter distances.
Whereas, at T2 = 100 ms, the key rate remains the same as that of Fig. 8(b), at T2 = 10 ms,
both repeater and non-repeater systems would fall short of supporting distances over 360 km.
Figure 11(b) shows the secret key generation rate per memory versus T2 at L = 250 km.
There is a minimum required coherence time of around 5 ms below which we cannot exchange
a secure key. This point corresponds to the 11% QBER mainly caused by the dephasing
process. In fact, at this point, we have ǫQ ≈ ed = (1−exp[−L/(cT2)])/2 = 0.11, which implies
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FIG. 11. (Color online) (a) The secret key generation rate versus distance for two values of decoherence
time, T2 = 10 ms and 100 ms. In (b) the secret key rate is plotted as a function of T2 at L = 250 km. In
both graphs, p = 10−3.
that the maximum distance supported by our protocol is about cT2/4. To be operating on
the flat region in the curves shown in Fig. 11(b), one even requires a higher coherence time.
In other words, the minimum required coherence time to support a link of length L is on the
order of 10L/c. This is in line with findings in [25]. Although not explicitly shown here, the
same requirements are expected to be as well applicable to other QKD systems that rely on
quantum repeaters.
B. SPS versus DLCZ
Figure 12 compares the secret key generation rate for the SPS protocol, found in this
paper, with that of the DLCZ protocol as obtained in [11]. In both systems, we have
assumed dc = 0. All other parameters are as in Table I. In both systems, we use the optimal
setting in the PNRD case. The conclusion would be similar if one uses NRPDs, as seen
in all numerical results presented in this paper. For the SPS protocol, the optimal setting
corresponds to the values of η in Table II. In the DLCZ protocol, the adjustable parameter
is the excitation probability pc. Note that, whereas in the SPS protocol, the rate decreases
monotonically with p, in the DLCZ protocol, it peaks at a certain value of pc. That is
because, in the SPS protocol, we use an on-demand source of photons, whereas in the DLCZ
protocol, the heralding probability as well as the relative double-photon probability are both
proportional to pc. The optimum value for the excitation probability is given by pc = 0.0243
in the no-repeater case and pc = 0.0060 in the one-node repeater case [11]. Note that the
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FIG. 12. (Color online) Comparison between the DLCZ and SPS protocols using PNRDs. For both systems,
the better of repeater or non-repeater system is used. Both systems operate at their optimal setting: For
the SPS protocol, the optimum value of η is used; for the DLCZ protocol, the optimum value of pc is used.
By varying the double-photon probability, p, in the SPS protocol, we find that the maximum p at which
SPS outperforms DLCZ is around p = 0.004. In all curves, dc = 0. All other parameters are taken from
Tables I and II.
analysis in [11] accounts for all multi-excitation components in the initial state of the system.
In all curves in Fig. 12, we have used the better of the repeater and no repeater systems at
each distance. Our results show that the SPS protocol offers a higher key rate per memory
than the DLCZ for on-demand single-photon sources with double-photon probabilities of
0.004 or lower. The advantage is however below one order of magnitude in most cases.
A key assumption in the results obtained above is the use of on-demand sources in the
SPS protocol. The less-than one-order-of-magnitude difference between the two protocols
can then be easily washed away if one uses single-photon sources with less than roughly 50%
efficiencies. This means that the conventional methods for generating single photons, such
as parametric downconversion or quantum dots, may not yet be useful in the SPS protocol.
The partial memory-readout technique could, still, be a viable solution. In this scheme,
we drive a Raman transition, as in the DLCZ protocol, in an atomic ensemble, such that
with some probability p a Stokes photon is released. If we detect such a photon, then we
are left with an ensemble, which can be partially read out with probability η to resemble
the first part of the SPS protocol. One should, however, note that with limitations on the
cutoff probability to be on the order of 10−4–10−5, it may take quite a long time to prepare
such a source-memory pair. For instance, if the required p is 10−4, and the efficiency of the
collection and detection setup is 0.1, even if we run the driving pulse at a 1 GHz rate, it
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takes on average 0.1 ms to prepare the initial state. This time is comparable to the time
that it takes for light to travel 100 km, which is on the same order of magnitude that we run
our cyclic protocol in Fig. 4(a). Considering a particular setup paramters, it is not then an
obvious call to which of the DLCZ or SPS protocols performs better, and that underlines
the importance of our theoretical analysis.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we analyzed the SPS protocol proposed in [17] in terms of the secret key
generation rate that it could offer in a QKD-over-repeater setup. This protocol belongs to
a family of probabilistic quantum repeaters, and perhaps one of their best, inspired by the
DLCZ proposal [10]. Our aim was to compare the SPS protocol, for QKD applications,
with the original DLCZ protocol, as reported in [11], in a realistic scenario. To this end, we
considered various sources of imperfections in our analysis and obtained the optimal regime of
operation as a function of system parameters. We accounted for double-photon probabilities
at the source and realized that, under Shor-Preskill’s security-proof assumptions, its value
should not exceed 0.11/4, in a direct-link scenario, and 0.11/20 in a one-node repeater case.
We would expect the same scaling, if not worse, at higher nesting levels, which implied that
for a repeater setup of nesting level 3, the double-photon probability must be on the order
of 10−4 or lower. That would be a challenging requirement for on-demand single-photon
sources needed in the SPS protocol. Under above circumstances, the advantage of the SPS
protocol over the DLCZ would be marginal and would not exceed one order of magnitude
of key rate in bit/s per memory. In our analysis, we also accounted for memory dephasing
and dark counts. Our results showed that the minimum required coherence time for a link
of length L is roughly given by 4L/c, where c is the speed of light in the channel. The
crossover distance at which we have to move up the nesting-level ladder varies for different
system parameters. The optimum distancing between repeater nodes can nevertheless be
typically as high as 150 km to 200 km depending on the measurement efficiency among
other parameters. We noticed that, within practical regimes of operation, there would only
be a minor advantage in using resolving photodetectors over more conventional threshold
detectors. We emphasized that, because of using a normalized figure of merit in our analysis,
our results would be applicable to multi-memory and/or -mode scenarios.
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ρin Bη,ηm (ρin)
|10 〉〈10| ηηm|01 〉〈01| + ηm
√
η (1− η) (|10 〉〈01| + |01 〉〈10| ) + ηm (1− η) |10 〉〈10| + (1− ηm) |00 〉〈00|
(1− ηm)2|00 〉〈00| + 2ηηm(1− ηm)|01 〉〈01| + ηη2m(1 − η)(|20 〉〈02| + |02 〉〈20|)
|20 〉〈20| +2ηm(1− ηm)
√
η(1− η)(|10 〉〈01| + |01 〉〈10| ) + η2η2m|02 〉〈02| + 2ηη2m(1− η)|11 〉〈11|
+η2m(1− η)
√
2η(1− η)(|20 〉〈11| + |11 〉〈20| ) + ηη2m
√
2η(1− η)(|02 〉〈11| + |11 〉〈02| )
+2ηm(1− η)(1 − ηm)|10 〉〈01| + η2m(1− η)2|20 〉〈20|
TABLE IV. The input-output relationship for the Bη,ηm operator. |jk〉〈jk| = |j〉JJ 〈j| ⊗ |k〉KK〈k|,
where J = L′ and K = R′ for input number states and J = L and K = R for output number
states in Fig. 6.
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Appendix A: Butterfly transformation
In this Appendix, we find input-output relationships for the butterfly module in Fig. 6.
We do this in the number-state representation, only for the relevant input states in Eq. (5).
Table IV provides the output state for the butterfly operation Bη,ηm when there is exactly
one or two photons at one of the input ports. These are the only relevant terms in the input
states in Eqs. (3) and (4). Using Table IV, we find Bη,ηm(ρ
(in)
l )⊗Bη,ηm(ρ(in)r ), to be used in
Eq. (5).
The last operation required in Eq. (5) is the symmetric butterfly operationB0.5,ηd . Table A
lists the input-output relationships for all relevant input terms in our system for the more
general operation B0.5,ηx . Note that by choosing ηx = ηs, we can use the same relationships
for the measurement modules used in entanglement swapping and QKD of Figs. 2 and 3,
respectively. For the sake of brevity, in Table A, we have only included the terms that provide
us with nonzero values after applying the measurement operation. More specifically, we have
removed all asymmetric density matrix terms, such as |10 〉〈01| or |01 〉〈10| , for which the
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ρin B0.5,ηx (ρin)
|10 〉〈10| ηx
2
(|10 〉〈10| + |01 〉〈01| ) + (1− ηx) |00 〉〈 00|
|01 〉〈01| ηx
2
(|10 〉〈10| + |01 〉〈01| ) + (1− ηx) |00 〉〈 00|
|11 〉〈11| ηx (1− ηx) (|10 〉〈10| + |01 〉〈01| ) + (1− ηx)2 |00 〉〈 00|+ η
2
x
2
(|20 〉〈20| + |02 〉〈02| )
|20 〉〈20| ηx (1− ηx) (|10 〉〈10| + |01 〉〈01| ) + (1− ηx)2 |00 〉〈 00|+ η
2
x
2
|11 〉〈11| + η2x
4
(|20 〉〈20| + |02 〉〈02| )
|02 〉〈02| ηx (1− ηx) (|10 〉〈10| + |01 〉〈01| ) + (1− ηx)2 |00 〉〈 00|+ η
2
2
|11 〉〈11| + η2x
4
(|20 〉〈20| + |02 〉〈02| )
|21 〉〈21| 3
2
ηx (1− ηx)2 (|10 〉〈10| + |01 〉〈01| ) + (1− ηx)3 |00 〉〈 00|+ η
2
x
2
(1− ηx) |11 〉〈11|
+ 5
4
η2x (1− ηx) (|20 〉〈20| + |02 〉〈02| ) + 38η3x (|30 〉〈30| + |03 〉〈03| ) + 18η3x (|21 〉〈21| + |12 〉〈12| )
|21 〉〈21| 3
2
ηx (1− ηx)2 (|10 〉〈10| + |01 〉〈01| ) + (1− ηx)3 |00 〉〈 00|+ η
2
x
2
(1− ηx) |11 〉〈11|
+ 5
4
η2x (1− ηx) (|20 〉〈20| + |02 〉〈02| ) + 38η3x (|30 〉〈30| + |03 〉〈03| ) + 18η3x (|21 〉〈21| + |12 〉〈12| )
|10 〉〈01| 1
2
ηx (|10 〉〈10| − |01 〉〈01| )
|01 〉〈10| 1
2
ηx (|10 〉〈10| − |01 〉〈01| )
|11 〉〈20|
√
2
2
ηx (1− ηx) (|10 〉〈10| − |01 〉〈01| ) + 12√2η2x (|20 〉〈20| − |02 〉〈02| )
|11 〉〈02|
√
2
2
ηx (1− ηx) (|10 〉〈10| − |01 〉〈01| ) + 12√2η2x (|20 〉〈20| − |02 〉〈02| )
|20 〉〈11|
√
2
2
ηx (1− ηx) (|10 〉〈10| − |01 〉〈01| ) + 12√2η2x (|20 〉〈20| − |02 〉〈02| )
|02 〉〈11|
√
2
2
ηx (1− ηx) (|10 〉〈10| − |01 〉〈01| ) + 12√2η2x (|20 〉〈20| − |02 〉〈02| )
|21 〉〈21| ηx (1− ηx)2 (|10 〉〈10| − |01 〉〈01| ) + η2x (1− ηx) (|20 〉〈20| − |02 〉〈02| )
+ 3
8
η3x (|30 〉〈30| − |03 〉〈03| ) + 18η3x (|12 〉〈12| − |21 〉〈21| )
|12 〉〈12| ηx (1− ηx)2 (|10 〉〈10| − |01 〉〈01| ) + η2x (1− ηx) (|20 〉〈20| − |02 〉〈02| )
+ 3
8
η3x (|30 〉〈30| − |03 〉〈03| ) + 18η3x (|12 〉〈12| − |21 〉〈21| )
(1− ηx)4 |00 〉〈 00|+ 2ηx (1− ηx)3 (|10 〉〈10| + |01 〉〈01| ) + η2x (1− ηx)2 |11 〉〈 11|
|22 〉〈22| + 3
2
η3x (1− ηx) (|30 〉〈30| + |03 〉〈03| ) + 12η3x (1− ηx) (|21 〉〈21| + |12 〉〈12| )
5
2
η2x (1− ηx)2 (|20 〉〈20| + |02 〉〈02| ) + 38η4x (|40 〉〈40| + |04 〉〈04| ) + 14η4x|22 〉〈 22|
TABLE V. The input-output relationship for a symmetric butterfly module. The notation used is
similar to that of Table IV.
bra state is different from the ket state, from the output state.
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Appendix B: Derivation of Pclick and Perror
In this Appendix, we find the gain and the QBER for the QKD scheme of Fig. 3. Let us
assume that the memory pairs AB and CD are already entangled via the no-repeater or the
one-node repeater scheme described in Sec. III. In the case of SPS protocol, their state is,
respectively, given by Eqs. (7) and (11). The density matrix right before photodetection in
Fig. 3 is then given by ρABCD = B0.5,ηs (B0.5,ηs (ρAB ⊗ ρCD)) , where one of the B-operators
is applied to modes A and C, and the other one to modes B and D. Using Table A, we can
calculate the exact form of ρABCD, as we have done in this paper.
The most general measurement on the modes entering the photodetectos of Fig. 3, namely,
A, B, C, and D, can be written in terms of the following measurement operators:
Mabcd = |a 〉AA〈 a| ⊗ |b 〉BB〈 b| ⊗ |c 〉CC〈 c| ⊗ |d 〉DD〈 d| (B1)
for PNRDs, where a, b, c, d = 0, 1 and |k 〉K represents a Fock state for the optical
mode K = A, B, C, D. In the case of NRPDs, we only need to replace |1 〉KK 〈1| with
(IK − |0 〉KK 〈0| ), where IK is the identity operator for mode K.
Similarly, we can define the corresponding probabilities to the above measurement oper-
ators as follows
Pabcd = Tr (ρABCDMabcd) . (B2)
The explicit forms for Pclick and Perror are then given by
Pclick = PC + PE (B3)
and
Perror = edPC + (1− ed)PE, (B4)
where ed is the dephasing (misalignment) error, and
PC =


(1− dc)2(P1100 + P0011 + dc(P1000 + P0100 + P0010 + P0001) + 2d2cP0000), PNRD(
d2c
2
− dc + 1
)
(P1100 + P0011) + dc(1− dc2 )(P1001 + P0110)
+dc
2
(2− dc)(P1000 + P0100 + P0010 + P0001) + d
2
c
2
(2− dc)2P0000
+1
2
(P1110 + P1101 + P0111 + P1011) +
dc
2
(2− dc)(P1010 + P0101) + 12P1111, NRPD
(B5)
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is the probability that Alice and Bob assign identical bits to their raw keys if there is no
misalignment, and
PE =


(1− dc)2(P1001 + P0110 + dc(P1000 + P0100 + P0010 + P0001) + 2d2cP0000), PNRD(
d2c
2
− dc + 1
)
(P1001 + P0110) +
dc
2
(2− dc)(P1000 + P0100 + P0010 + P0001)
+d
2
c
2
(2− dc)2P0000 + 12(P1110 + P1101 + P0111 + P1011)
+dc
2
(2− dc)(P1100 + P1010 + P0011 + P0101) + 12P1111, NRPD
(B6)
is the probability that they make an erroneous bit assignment in the absence of misalignment.
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